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The rise of the BRIC economies 
BRIC – the acronym for Brazil-Russia-India-China – has almost drawn as much puns 
and quips as it has inspired discussions about the shifting weight in the world economy. 
Hinting at the dominating  role  of  China,  David  Rothkopf  pointed  out  that  ‘[w]ithout  China,  
the BRICs are just the BRI, a bland, soft cheese that is primarily known for the whine that 
goes  with   it’   [1].  When   South  Africa   joined   the   BRIC   summit   for   the   first   time   in   2011,  
turning BRIC into BRICS, Russian President Medvedev suggested that the new Russian 
acronym   should   be   БРЮКИ   to   make   it   easier   to   remember   for   Russians   (the   letter  Ю  
correspondes to the first letter in the Russian name for South Africa and turns the acronym 
into the Russian word for trousers). Expressing his disdain for the motley mixture of states 
it lumped together, Andrew Weiss dubbed the concept the BRIC-à-brac, the French term 
for a collection of random curiosities [2]. And those who felt that BRIC unduly focused the 
attention on a few large emerging markets have promoted CEMENT – countries in 
emerging markets excluded by new terminology.  
Yet, despite frequent bon mots and misgivings about the concept, the brainchild of 
Jim   O’Neill,   chief   economist   of   the   investment bank Goldman Sachs, has made a 
remarkable   career   within   just   ten   years   [3].   O’Neill’s   seminal   report   was   based   on   a  
projection of real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) GDP growth from 2001 to 2010. On this basis, he 
predicted that the centre of gravitation in the world economy would move towards 
emerging   economies.   No   longer  would   the  world’s   richest   economies   also   be   its   largest.  
Ten  years  later,   it  appears  apposite  to  assess  O’Neill’s  projections.  Have  they  been  far  off  
the mark? Yes, in that they over- or underestimated growth rates, sometimes severely so 
(see Table 1). China, for example, grew 3.5 percentage points faster than predicted, despite 
the financial crisis of 2008, whereas the US grew 1.3 percentage points slower. But no, in 
that the predicted shift of the relative economic weight towards the BRIC countries turned 
out  to  be  even  more  marked  than  O’Neill  had  predicted.  The  economic  development  of  the  
BRICs and the sluggish growth in the established economies more than vindicated 
O’Neill’s  initial  thesis.  
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Table 1 
Predicted and de-facto GDP growth in the BRIC countries, 2001–2010 
 
 Annual real GDP growth (2001-2010) 
 prediction de facto deviation 
Brazil 4.0 3.6 − 
Russia 4.0 4.9 + 
India  5.0 7.5 + 
China 7.0 10.5 + 
USA 3.0 1.7 − 
Euro Area 2.5 2.0 − 
UK 2.5 1.4 − 
Japan 1.0 0.7 − 
Sources: [3] and [4] 
 
If we adjust GDP growth for purchasing power, the BRICs in 2001 had a 17.0% share 
of world GDP, whereas this stood at 25.0% only ten years later. This increase was largely 
driven by China, which upped its share in the world economy from 7.6% to 14.3% in this 
period,  whereas  Brazil’s  contribution  remained  rather  constant  [4]  Figure  1  shows  that  in  
terms of total purchasing power, China is drawing close to the US and logged remarkable 
growth rates over the past 30 years. Brazil and Russia, both rather resource-dependent 
economies,   are   on   a   considerably   slower   growth   path.   Russia’s   shrinkage   bottomed   out  
towards the end of the 1990s and it returned to sustained growth in 1999, while Brazil had 
a somewhat lower overall growth rate. 
 
 
Figure 1: Development of total GDP (PPP$) in the BRICs from 1980 to 2010 as 
compared to the United States and the EU-15 (Source: [5]) 
 
A look at the statistics for GDP per person (Figure 2) reveals that there is still much 
catching up to do for BRIC countries in terms of individual wealth. GDP per person of the 
wealthiest BRIC country, Russia, is still only one-fourth of that of the United States. What 
is more, total economic growth has not always translated into people becoming wealthier. 
China has done best in converting total growth into individual income increases, whereas 
Brazil has largely grown due to population growth and not because its population became 
wealthier.  
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Figure 2: Development of GDP per person (PPP$) in the BRICs from 1980 to 2010  
as compared to the United States and the EU-15 (Source: [5]) 
 
Extending our purview beyond a narrow focus on the GDP reveals a number of 
fundamental differences between the BRICs (Table 2). India, for example, is a member of 
the BRICs by virtue of the size of its economy but still has to grapple with major challenges 
in the area of human development. Adequate nutrition and basic education are still not the 
rule in many parts of the country: more than three quarters of its population live below the 
$2 (PPP) poverty line and more than one third are illiterate. Only 5 out of every 100 people 
are classified as internet users and most of its population lives in rural areas. For many 
people in India, the glitzy world of global business that gave birth to the concept of BRIC is 
a far cry from their daily realities.  
Russia, by contrast, stands out because of its dismal performance in governance. 
Although all BRIC economies are far removed from the liberal ideal, Russia is particularly 
so. Corruption and graft are wide-spread and legal nihilism undermines the rule of law. In 
comparison to residents of the other BRIC countries, Russians also score much worse on 
the other major indicator of human well-being: happiness. According to the World Values 
Survey, Brazilians are three times more likely to feel very happy than Russians. Indians are 
also happier than their Russian and Chinese counterparts, underscoring that material 
wealth is not equal to spiritual well-being. When it comes to androcentrism and 
nationalism, Russia and India are unexpected sparring partners: both countries have high 
levels of nationalism, paired with high levels of androcentrism. In Brazil and China, 
declared androcentrism is much lower. The closest match, again, seems to be on the 
economic side: what unites citizens of the BRIC states is a strong preference for pursuing 
economic growth as the primary aim of the country over other aims such as more public 
participation.  
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Table 2 
Key indicators of the BRIC economies (2009) (Source: [5],  
unless indicated otherwise) 
 
 Brazil Russia India China 
     
Socio-Economic Indicators     
Population (2009) [million] 193.7 141.9 1,155.3 1,331.5 
Population (projection 2030) [6] 240.2 124.1 1,460.7 1,391.5 
Population (projection 2050) [6] 260.7 109.2 1,656.6 1,303.7 
GDP [trillion current USD] 1.59 1.23 1.38 4.99 
GDP per capita [current USD] 8,230 8,684 1,192 3,744 
GDP per capita, PPP [current 
USD] 
10,367 18,932 3,296 6,828 
Income level upper 
middle 
upper 
middle 
lower 
middle 
lower 
middle 
External debt stocks [of GNI] 17.9% 31.9% 18.2% 8.7% 
Current account balance [of 
GDP] 
−  1.5% 4.0% −  1.9% 6.0% 
Inflation, GDP deflator 5.7% 2.5% 7.5% −  0.6% 
Agriculture [of GDP] 6% 5% 16% 10% 
Adult Literacy Rate 90.0% 99.6% 62.8% 
(2006) 
94.0% 
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a 
day, PPP  
9.9% 0.1% 75.6% 36.3% 
(2005) 
Income share held by highest 
10% 
42.5% 33.5% 31.1% 31.4% 
(2005) 
Life expectancy at birth [years] 72.6 68.9 64.1 73.3 
Internet users [per 100] 39.2 42.1 5.3 28.8 
Urban population [of total] 86.0% 72.8% 29.8% 44.0% 
Military expenditure [of GDP] 1.6% 4.3% 2.7% 2.0% 
CO2 emissions [metric tons per 
capita] (2007) 
1.94 10.8 1.43 4.95 
Ease of Doing Business 124th  116th 135th  78th  
World Governance 
Indicators  
[percentiles – higher is better] 
Voice and Accountability 62 23 60 5 
Political Stability 54 22 13 30 
Government Effectiveness 58 45 54 58 
Regulatory Quality 55 35 44 46 
Rule of Law 50 24 56 45 
Control of Corruption 56 11 47 36 
World Values Survey 2005     
Feeling  of  happiness  [“very  
happy”] 
34.1% 11.0% 29.0% 21.2% 
Aims of the country for the next 
ten years?  
    
Economic growth 59.0% 74.1% 49.5% 45.3% 
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Strong defence forces 9.3% 12.2% 14.3% 22.7% 
People should have a greater say 25.6% 11.4% 13.8% 8.1% 
Pride  of  nationality  [“very  
proud”] 
39.3% 45.8% 72.8% 21.3% 
Men make better political leaders 
than  women  [“agree  strongly”] 
5.9% 24.2% 21.2% 9.9% 
 
The reconfiguration of global economic ties and its cultural implications   
As BRIC economies are becoming more important in the world economy, we can expect a 
reconfiguration of global economic ties and a growth in intercultural contact. In international 
business growing investment ties will lead to more contacts, both in negotiations with foreign 
partners and as expatriates are sent to open new or manage acquired foreign subsidiaries. This 
relationship works both ways. Savvy investors from established economies enter BRIC countries to 
do business and take advantage of growing markets. At the same time, companies from BRIC 
countries increasingly have a size and purchasing power that allows them to expand their interests 
abroad and invest in other economies [7]. This section will examine in more detail the 
interpenetration of BRIC and established economies through foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
transnational corporations and its (inter-)cultural implications.  
Foreign direct investment is the most significant channel of creating business ties which lead 
to long-lasting intercultural contacts. FDI now outstrips trade in its importance for delivering 
goods and services to foreign markets [8]. While trade presents a mode of economic exchange with 
rather limited intercultural contact, FDI – whether in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
or greenfield investment – comes with a stronger exposure to cultural difference as companies set 
up shop in foreign countries. While dealing with cultural differences in a corporate setting already 
poses a challenge within the familiar confines of North America and Western Europe [9], this 
situation  is  exacerbated  as  BRIC  economies  enter  the  field  as  major  players.  The  case  of  Brazil’s  
Vale acquiring Canadian Inco is instructive here (see Text Box 1).  
Text Box 1: Cultural conflicts: Brazilian Vale buys Canadian Inco 
When Brazilian mining giant Vale bought Canadian Inco for USD 16.7 billion in 2006, the 
deal came as a surprise to many. Its size marked a milestone for BRIC companies acquiring stakes 
in established economies and underscored the financial prowess of BRIC corporations. It was 
Vale’s  first  major  deal  abroad  and  it  should  soon  cause  its  top  management  major  headaches.  In  a  
clash of   organizational   cultures,   Vale’s   top-down management style conflicted with a more 
consensual approach at Inco, resulting in strained relations. A few weeks after the acquisition a 
meeting between Vale and Inco top management came to an abrupt end with what the Financial 
Times describes  as  “one  of  the  Brazilians  losing  his  temper  [and  snapping]  ‘How  come,  if  you’re  so  
smart,  you  didn’t  take  us  over?’  …  ‘We’re  a  culture  of  ‘why?’’  says  a  former  Inco  executive,  referring  
to the constant exchange of ideas and decentralised decision-making that was encouraged by the 
former  Canadian  management.  On  the  other  hand,  he  says,  “the  Brazilians  were:  ‘I  told  you  to  do  
this.  Now  do  it.’  …  Hinting  at  the  disdain  that  the  Canadians  felt  towards  their  new  bosses,  one  of  
the  former  Inco  employees  says  that  “to  run  an  iron  ore  business  [Vale’s  core  business]  is  almost  
like a high school diploma. Nickel [Inco’s  core  business]  is  a  PhD.” [10] 
In the course of the integration, the majority of Inco's senior management and key engineers 
were replaced. Vale's unilateral attempt to restructure the bonus system and to switch from a 
defined-benefit to a defined-contribution benefit pension scheme resulted in a prolonged strike by 
miners. Culture was at the centre of the heated disputes. One union representative is quoted as 
saying:   “Vale   can  go   and  get   stuffed.  We  are   sick  and   tired  of   foreign   capitalists   coming   in  and  
undermining  the  Canadian  way  of  life”  [11].  “They  are  not  going  to  change  our  culture”  [12].   
Statistical evidence bears out the assumption that mutual investment ties are intensifying. 
The World Investment Prospects Survey puts the four BRIC states in the top five of the most 
attractive economies, with the United States being the only other economy making it into this 
group [13]. In 2009, the BRICs attracted 17.4% of the global FDI inward flows (China 8.5%, Russia 
3.5%, India 3.1%, Brazil 2.3%), roughly matching the relative shares in global output and topping 
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the table of FDI inflows to emerging and developing economies. All BRIC countries experienced a 
dramatic surge in inbound FDI in the middle of the 1990s, with China benefitting most (Figure 3). 
Towards the end of the 2000s, inbound FDI more or less stabilized at high levels in a range 
between 2.5% and 5.0% of GDP. By comparison, for the G7 this range was much lower, between 
1.0% and 2.5% [13]. Figure 5 shows that China had the largest absolute inward FDI stock, but 
Brazil had the largest stock relative to the size of its economy.  
By contrast, outward FDI from the BRIC countries only started to become significant in the 
early 2000s and remains at lower relative levels than inbound FDI (Figure 4). The share of BRIC 
outward FDI in global FDI stood at only about half of the inflows (9.0%) [13]. Russia is the most 
active BRIC country in this category, whereas China and India are latecomers and have only 
recently discovered their appetite for investing abroad. Relative outward FDI from the BRICs is 
drawing closer to that of the G7, which in the past years has fluctuated between 2.0 and 4.0% of 
GDP  [13].  As  a  result,  outward  FDI  stocks  have  jumped  up  sharply  (Figure  6).  Brazil’s  stock  has  
increased more than three-fold  between  2000  and  2009,  China’s  eight-fold,  Russia’s  twelve-fold 
and  India’s  thirty-eight-fold, albeit all from very low levels [13].  
 
 
Figure 3: Development of incoming foreign direct investment (% of GDP) in the 
BRICs from 1980 to 2010 (Source: [13]) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Development of outward foreign direct investment (% of GDP) in the BRICs 
from 1980 to 2010 (Source: [13]) 
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Figure 5: Development of inward FDI stocks (current USD billion) in the BRICs from 
1993 to 2010 (Source: [13]) 
 
 
Figure 6: Development of outward FDI stocks (current USD billion) in the BRICs 
from 1993 to 2010 (Source: [13]) 
 
The characteristics of outward FDI vary among the BRIC countries with no clear 
patterns. For Brazil and Russia the major destinations are established economies, India 
has a roughly equal balance of established and emerging economies, whereas China 
predominantly targets developing economies. In Russia, the primary sector dominates as a 
target of outward FDI, in India the secondary sector and in China and Brazil it is the 
tertiary sector [14; 15; 16]. 
Despite   the   BRICs’   quick   growth   in   outward   FDI,   BRIC   transnational   corporations 
(TNCs) still show a low degree of foreign assets, sales and employment when compared to 
TNCs in established economies. Only two TNCs from BRIC countries are listed among the 
world’s  100   largest  TNCs   in   terms  of   foreign  assets,  and  both  of   them  are  Chinese state-
owned companies: The investment company CITIC Group is ranked 48th, just above Swiss 
Novartis, while China Ocean Shipping, a shipping and logistics company, is ranked 80th, 
just above Swiss Holcim. Of the largest BRIC TNCs, a vast majority operate in resource-
based sectors such as oil and gas, mining and metals (Table 3). Knowledge-based and 
tertiary sector industries are an exception, with the Russian Sistema as the only tertiary 
sector company to make it into the top 50 TNCs from developing and emerging economies. 
A significant proportion of these companies is state-owned or state-controlled, such as all 
Chinese TNCs in Table 3, Brazilian Petrobras, Russian Gazprom and Indian Oil and 
Natural Gas Corporation.  
European researcher.  2011.  №  12  (15) 
1622 
 
Table 3 
Ranking of BRIC TNCs among the top 50 non-financial TNCs from developing 
and emerging economies by foreign assets (2008) (Source: [17]) 
 
     Foreign 
Ran
k 
Origi
n 
Logo Corporatio
n 
Sector Assets 
[millio
n 
USD] 
Sales 
[millio
n 
USD] 
Staff 
2 
 
 
CITIC Group Conglomerate 43 750 5 427 18 305 
7 
 
 
China Ocean 
Shipping 
Shipping and 
Logistics 
28 066 18 041 4 581 
8 
 
 
Lukoil Oil and Gas 21 515 87 637 23 00
0 
9 
 
 Vale Mining 19 635 30 939 4 725 
* 
  
Gazprom Oil and Gas 17 326 58 415 9 000 
15 
 
 Tata Steel Metals 16 826 26 426 45 86
4 
16 
 
 Petrobras Oil and Gas 15 075 40 179 6 775 
18 
 
 Gerdau Metals 13 658 10 724 22 315 
20 
 
 
Oil and 
Natural Gas 
Corporation 
Oil and Gas 13 477 4 238 3 291 
23 
 
 Evraz Metals and 
Mining 
11 196 12 805 29 48
0 
27 
 
 China 
National 
Petroleum 
Oil and Gas 9 409 4 384 20 48
9 
29 
 
 
Hindalco 
Industries 
Metals 8 564 11 371 13 447 
32 
 
 Severstal Metals 8 066 9 325 12 662 
37 
 
 
China State 
Construction 
& 
Engineering 
Construction 7 015 3 619 15 765 
40 
 
 Tata Motors Automobile 6 767 9 869 17 998 
47 
 
 Sinochem Conglomerate 6 409 34 218 225 
50 
 
 Sistema Telecom 5 698 3 983 11 000 
 
* 2007 data from [18]; not listed in [17] 
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With the rapid growth of outward FDI in the past years, however, BRIC TNCs are 
likely to make further inroads into the global top 100 TNCs and become more active 
abroad [19]. Among the largest deals in the recent past have been the 2007 acquisition of 
the British Corus Group by the Indian Tata Steel for USD 13.5 billion and the 2006 
acquisition of Canadian Inco by Vale for USD 16.7 billion (see Text Box 1). But big deals are 
also   closed   with   other   BRIC   economies   and   developing   countries:   Sinopec’s   2010  
acquisition   of   a  minority   stake   in   Repsol’s   Brazilian   operations   for   USD   7.1   billion   and  
India’s  Bharti  Airtel  acquisition  of  Nigeria’s  Zain  Africa   for  USD  10.7  billion  are   likely   to  
mark only the beginning of a larger acquisition and investment spree fuelled by strong 
growth of corporate revenues and profits in the BRIC economies.  
Notwithstanding the rapid expansion of TNCs from BRIC economies, inward 
investment from TNCs headquartered in established economies still dominates the game 
in BRIC economies. Liberalisations, deregulations and other improvements in the 
investment climate have driven part of the inward FDI growth in the BRIC economies. 
With  China’s  accession  to  the  WTO  in  2001  and  Russia’s  expected  entry  for  2012,  barriers  
for FDI are progressively being removed. The EU is the main source of inward FDI for 
Brazil and Russia with more than half of the capital inflows originating there. The figures 
for India and China are much lower, which is partly attributable to the significant intra-
regional investment flows in Asia, but they still outstrip the inward flows from both the US 
and Japan [20]. Even though the EU is a major investor, the share of BRIC holdings in the 
total FDI stocks has only been growing slowly. This can in part be attributed to attractive 
investment opportunities elsewhere, specifically in Eastern Europe, and the still high 
dominance of established economies in the FDI market [20].  
The sectoral distribution of inward FDI into BRICs is rather uneven. In India and 
Brazil, the service sector attracts the majority of FDI, whereas it is manufacturing in China 
and oil and gas in Russia [21; 22; 23]. All BRIC states boast a significant presence of wholly 
or   partly   owned   foreign   subsidiaries.   Large   recent   M&A   deals   have   included   Spain’s  
Telefonica buying a USD 10.5 billion stake in Vivo, the largest Brazilian mobile phone 
operator, and Pepsi acquiring Wimm-Bill-Dann, a Russian dairy and fruit juice company, 
for USD 3.8 billion.  
The   emerging   shift   from   ‘cosy’  M&As   within  Western   Europe   and   North   America,  
which for the time being are still the home markets of the big deals, to M&As between 
companies from BRIC and established economies has so far received little attention from 
scholars. The reconfiguration of global economic ties in what is sometimes called the 
second wave of globalization underscores the necessity of dealing with challenges 
associated with firm integration and intercultural communication. The expectations of the 
new partners are often divergent, not least because they operate in different institutional 
environments. In addition to issues of organizational culture, geopolitical sensitivities can 
also intervene, as the case of Rio Tinto and Chinalco demonstrates (Text Box 2). This 
global reconfiguration calls for an approach that is more sensitive to cultural differences at 
different scale levels, from the global and institutional to the organizational and individual. 
For, as in the case of Rio Tinto and Chinalco, companies in BRIC states are embedded into 
particular institutional environments and geopolitical rationalities that shape their scope 
of action just as much as the organizational and individual factors that have hitherto drawn 
the largest share of attention.  
Text Box 2: Who is afraid of the yellow man? Opposition to M&A bids 
from BRIC economies – the case of Rio Tinto and Chinalco 
While greenfield investments propose to build new production capacities and create 
new jobs, M&A bids are often received with some apprehension, because of the potential 
downsizing of the workforce and shutting down of operations that sometimes comes with 
the realisation of synergies. In the case of BRIC TNCs bidding for corporate takeovers, 
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there has frequently been fierce opposition nurtured by fears of the culturally alien which 
has resulted in deals being postponed or shelved altogether [24]. The controversy 
surrounding the bid by Chinalco, a Chinese mining firm, for an almost USD 20 billion 
stake in the Anglo-Australian  Rio  Tinto,  one  of   the  world’s   largest  mining  companies,   in  
2009 is an instructive example. The bid was initially welcomed by senior management as 
providing additional liquidity to refinance existing debts in the midst of the financial crisis. 
But the Australian government and regulators were very apprehensive of growing Chinese 
influence in a strategically important sector. This fear was heightened as the Australians 
considered the state-owned Chinalco a pawn of the Chinese government in the game to 
secure the supply of iron-ore   in   what   has   been   a   seller’s   market.   Rio   Tinto   eventually  
spurned the deal and China retaliated with an arrest of four Rio Tinto staff on charges of 
bribery and cartel formation, which temporarily soured relationships between Australia 
and China [25]. In this case, the mix of cultural reservation and geopolitical concerns 
created an explosive cocktail that brought down the proposed investment.  
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Аннотация.   В   статье   изучается   влияние   стран   БРИК   (Бразилия-Россия-
Индия-Китай)   через   призму   центральных   социо-экономических   показателей,  
включая   показатели   государственного   управления   Всемирного   банка   и   пересмотр  
мировых   ценностей,   учитывается   сдвиг   в   экономических   показателях   и   начало  
изменений   в   экономических   связях,   о   чем   свидетельствуют прямые   иностранные  
инвестиции   и   появление   транснациональных   корпораций   и   рассматриваются  
итоговые  проблемы  межкультурных  контактов  на  разных  уровнях  посредством  двух 
кратких  предметных  исследований.   
Ключевые   слова:   БРИК;;   Бразилия;;   Россия;;   Индия;;   Китай;;   растущие  
экономики;;   глобальная   экономика;;   прямые   иностранные   инвестиции;;  
транснациональные  корпорации. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
